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Marketing in a random network
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INRIA, ENS Paris and Imperial College London
Abstract. Viral marketing takes advantage of preexisting social net-
works among customers to achieve large changes in behaviour. Models
of influence spread have been studied in a number of domains, including
the effect of “word of mouth” in the promotion of new products or the
diffusion of technologies. A social network can be represented by a graph
where the nodes are individuals and the edges indicate a form of social
relationship. The flow of influence through this network can be thought
of as an increasing process of active nodes: as individuals become aware
of new technologies, they have the potential to pass them on to their
neighbours. The goal of marketing is to trigger a large cascade of adop-
tions. In this paper, we develop a mathematical model that allows to
analyze the dynamics of the cascading sequence of nodes switching to
the new technology. To this end we describe a continuous-time and a
discrete-time models and analyse the proportion of nodes that adopt the
new technology over time.
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1 Introduction
With consumers showing increasing resistance to traditional forms of advertising,
marketers have turned to alternate strategies like viral marketing. Viral market-
ing exploits existing social networks by encouraging customers to share product
information with their friends. Social networks are graphs in which nodes repre-
sent individuals and edges represent relations between them. To illustrate viral
marketing, consider a company that wishes to promote its new instant messen-
ger (IM) system [7]. A promising way would be through popular social network
such as Myspace: by convincing several persons to adopt the new IM system,
the company can obtain an effective marketing campaign and diffuse the new
system over the network.
If we assume that “convincing” a person to “spread” the new technology
costs money, then a natural problem is to detect the influential members of the
network who can trigger a cascade of influence in the most effective way [2],
[5]. In this work, we consider a slightly different problem: the marketer has no
knowledge of the social network. Hence he will not be able to detect the most
influential individuals and his only solution is to “convince” a fraction of the total
population. However, the marketer can still use the structure of the underlying
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network by targeting the neighbours of the adopters. There are a number of
incentive programs around this idea: each time an individual chooses the new
technology, he is given the opportunity to send e-mail to friends with a special
offer; if the friend goes on to buy it, each of the individuals receives a small cash
bonus.
In this paper, we develop a mathematical model that allows to analyze the
dynamics of the cascading sequence of nodes switching to the new technology.
To this end we describe a continuous-time and a discrete-time models and an-
alyze the proportion of nodes that adopt the new technology over time. In the
continuous setting we derive a general bound for the proportion of new adopters
in terms global graph properties, namely the spectral radius and the minimum
degree. In the discrete setting we show that the proportion of new adapters is
the solution of a fixed point equation. To this end we examine the case of reg-
ular trees, and prove that our approach carries over to random regular graphs.
We extend our model to the general threshold model [5] and to sparse random
graphs. We conclude by presenting a framework that enables the control of the
marketing policy and discuss other possible applications.
2 Model
We consider a set of n agents represented by an undirected graph structure
G = (V,E) accounting for their interaction. For i, j ∈ V , we write i ∼ j if
(i, j) ∈ E and we say that agents i and j are neighbours. As in [11], we consider
binary models where each agent may choose between two possible strategies
that we denote by A and B. Let us introduce a game-theoretic diffusion model
proposed by Morris [9]: Whenever two neighbours in the graph opt for strategy
A they receive a payoff qA, if they both choose B they receive a payoff qB, and
they receive nothing if they choose opposite strategies. The payoff of an agent
corresponds to the sum of its payoffs with each of its neighbours.
Initially all nodes play A except for a small number of nodes that are forced to
adopt strategyB. The nodes that started with strategyA will subsequently apply
best-response updates. More precisely, these nodes will be repeatedly applying
the following rule: switch to B if enough of your neighbours have already adopted
B. There can be a cascading sequence of nodes switching to B such that a
network-wide equilibrium is reached in the limit. This equilibrium may involve
uniformity with all nodes adopting B or it may involve coexistence, with the
nodes partitioned into a set adopting B and a set sticking to A.
The state of agent i is represented by Xi; Xi = 0 if player i plays strategy A
and Xi = 1 otherwise. Hence
∑
j∼iXj is the number of neighbours of i playing
strategy B and
∑
j∼i(1 −Xj) is the number of neighbors of i playing strategy
A.
We now describe the economic model for the agents. Recall that the payoff
for a A − A edge is qA, for a B − B edge is qB and for a A − B edge is 0.
We assume that if an agent chooses A, his payoff is just the sum of the payoffs
obtained on each of his incident edges but if he chooses B, his payoff is the sum
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of these payoffs increased by an amount u ≥ 0 plus a bonus of r ≥ 0. Now the
total payoff for an agent is given by
SAi = qA
∑
j∼i
(1−Xj) for strategy A,
SBi = r + (qB + u)
∑
j∼i
Xj for strategy B. (1)
We consider that qA and qB are fixed and correspond to the level of perfor-
mance of the technologies A and B.
By (1), we have SBi ≤ S
A
i iff
r + (qB + u)
∑
j∼i
Xj ≤ qA
∑
j∼i
(1−Xj) ⇔
∑
j∼i
Xj ≤ θ(di), (2)
with θ(d) := qAd−r
qA+qB+u
and di is the degree (number of neighbours) of i. We now
explain the dynamics of our model for the spread of strategy B in the network
as time t evolves. We consider a fixed network G (not evolving in time) and let
all agents play A for t < 0. At time t = 0, some agents are forced to strategy B.
These agents will always play strategy B, hence the dynamics described below
does not apply to these initially forced agents. We encode the initial population
forced to strategy B by a vector χ, where χi = 1 if agent i is forced to B and
χi = 0 otherwise. We will assume that the vector χ = (χi)i∈V is a sequence of
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter α.
3 Continuous-time dynamic
We first consider the following continuous version of the contagion model. As-
sume that each non infected node i updates its state at rate 1 and it holds on to
strategy A if (2) is satisfied and switches to B if
∑
j∼iXj(t) > θ(di). The state
at time t is represented by a vector X(t). Denote by A the adjacency matrix of
the graph G and let λ1(A) the spectral radius of A, namely, its largest eigen-
value and by dmin the minimum degree of graph G. In addition we will assume
that the graph is connected so that dmin ≥ 1 and λ1(A) has multiplicity one.
Therefore we have, Xi(0) = χi, for all i ∈ V , and
Xi : 0→ 1 at rate 1

∑
j
AijXj(t) > θ(di)

 .
Note that 1
(∑
j AijXj(t) > θ(di)
)
≤
P
j AijXj(t)
θ(di)
. We now consider the con-
tinuous time Markov process Z(t) = (Zi(t))i∈V , with Z(0) = X(0), and transi-
tion rate:
Zi : k → k + 1 at rate
∑n
j=1 AijZj(t)
θ(dmin)
,
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standard coupling arguments yield X(t) ≤st Z(t) for all t ≥ 0, where X ≤st Z
denotes that Z stochastically dominates X . This implies that
∑n
i=1 E(Xi(t)) ≤∑n
i=1 E(Zi(t)). Moreover, the transition rates of the process Z are such that
dE[Z(t)]
dt
=
A
θ(dmin)
E[Z(t)],
Hence
E[Z(t)] = e
t
θ(dmin)
A
E[Z(0)]. (3)
Using Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we obtain that
∑n
i=1 E(Zi(t)) ≤ ||E(Z(t))||2||1||2.
Combining this with (3), we have that
Theorem 1. Let β(t) be the proportion of nodes that opted for strategy B by
time t. Then
β(t) :=
∑n
i=1 E(Xi(t))
n
≤ αe
λ1(A)
θ(dmin)
t
.
Moreover if the G is a regular graph with degree ∆, then, using the spectral
decomposition of the matrix e
t
θ(∆)
A, we have that
β(t) ≤
α
∆
e
∆
θ(∆)
t
The above result states that the number of nodes that have adopted B in-
creases at most exponentially in time and that the speed is given by λ1(A)
θ(dmin)
.
Similar results have been found in [3] in the case of the Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) epidemic.
As a matter of example for Erdo¨s-Re´nyi graphs G(n, p) with parameters n
and p in the regime log(n) << np, Theorem 1 yields β(t) ≤ αe
np
θ(np)
t with high
probability.
In the next section, we describe a discrete-time version of our contagion model
for which we derive more accurate results for the proportion of B-adopters and
illustrate the coexistence of the two strategies.
4 Discrete-time dynamic
The state of the network at time t is described by the vector (Xi(t))i∈V , t ∈ N.
We have Xi(0) = χi and Xi(t) ≥ χi. Then at each time step t ≥ 1, each agent
applies the best-response update: if SBi > S
A
i then he chooses B and if not then
he chooses A. It is readily seen that
1−Xi(t+ 1) = (1 − χi)1
(
SBi (t) ≤ S
A
i (t)
)
. (4)
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4.1 Diffusion process on the infinite regular tree
Let T (∆) be an infinite ∆-regular tree with nodes Ø, 1, 2, . . ., with a fixed root
Ø. For a node i, we denote by gen(i) ∈ N the generation of i, i.e. the length of
the minimal path from Ø to i. Also we denote i→ j if i belongs to the children
of j, i.e. gen(i) = gen(j) + 1 and j is on the minimal path from Ø to i. For an
edge (i, j) with i→ j, we denote by Ti→j the sub-tree of T with root i obtained
by the deletion of edge (i, j) from T .
For a given vector χ, we say that node i 6= Ø is infected from Ti→j if the
node i switches to B in Ti→j
⋃
{(i, j)} with the same vector χ for Ti→j and the
strategy A for j. We denote by Yi(t) the corresponding indicator function with
value 1 if i is infected from Ti→j at time t and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1. We have
1−XØ(t+ 1) = (1 − χØ)1
(∑
i∼Ø
Yi(t) ≤ θ(∆)
)
. (5)
The representation (5) is crucial to our analysis. In fact, thanks to the tree
structure, the random variables (Yi(t), i ∼ Ø) are independent of each other
and identically distributed. More precisely, a simple induction shows that (4)
becomes, for i 6= Ø:
1− Yi(t+ 1) = (1− χi)1

∑
j→i
Yj(t) ≤ θ(∆)

 . (6)
Note that (6) allows to compute all the Yi(t) recursively, starting with Yi(0) = χi.
It is then easy to compute their distribution from (6). We summarize this result
in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. For t fixed, the sequence (Yi(t), i ∼ Ø) is a sequence of i.i.d.
Bernoulli random variables with parameter h(t) given by h(0) = α and, for t ≥ 0,
h(t+ 1) = P(Yi(t+ 1) = 1) = 1− (1− α)g∆−1,θ(∆)(h(t)),
where gk,s(x) = P (Bin(k, x) ≤ s). Bin(k, x) corresponds to the binomial distri-
bution with parameters k and x.
Combining Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain that
Theorem 2. XØ(t) is a Bernoulli random variable with parameter h˜(t) given
by
P(XØ(t+ 1) = 1) = h˜(t+ 1) = 1− (1− α)g∆,θ(∆)(h(t)). (7)
Moreover let h∗ the smallest solution of the following fixed point equation
h = 1− (1− α)g∆−1,θ(∆)(h). (8)
Suppose 0 ≤ θ(∆) < ∆ − 2. There exists αcrit < 1 such that for all α > αcrit,
the fixed point equation (8) has a unique solution h∗ = 1 and for all α < αcrit it
has three solutions h∗ < h∗∗ < h∗∗∗ = 1.
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4.2 Random regular graphs
We now come back to the process (X
(n)
i (t))i∈V on G
(n)
∆ , a random ∆−regular
graph, satisfying (4). Given d ≥ 1, let N(i, d,G
(n)
∆ ) be the set of vertices of
G
(n)
∆ that are at a distance at most d from i ∈ G
(n)
∆ . A depth-d ∆-regular
tree T (∆, d) is the restriction of T (∆) to nodes i with gen(i) ≤ d. A simple
induction on t shows that X
(n)
i (t) is determined by the {χj, j ∈ N(i, t, G
(n)
∆ )}.
Using the following convergence [4]: for any fixed d ≥ 1, we have as n tends to
infinity N(0, d, Gn∆)
d
→ T (∆, d), we have X
(n)
0 (t)
d
→ XØ(t) as n tends to infinity.
Therefore the process defined on the tree in Section 4.1 is a good approximation
of the real process. Hence,
Proposition 3. For any fixed t ≥ 0, we have
lim
n→∞
E
[
X
(n)
i (t)
]
= h˜(t) (9)
where h˜(t) is defined in (7).
Let β(n)(t) be the proportion of agents choosingB at time t: β(n)(t) =
∑
iX
(n)
i (t)/n.
We have as n→∞,
E
[
β(n)(t)
]
= E
[
X
(n)
i (t)
]
→ h˜(t). (10)
The final proportion of agents choosing B is β(n) = limt→∞ β
(n)(t).
Proposition 4. We have
lim
n→∞
E
[
β(n)
]
= h˜, (11)
in particular, for α ≥ αcrit, we have
lim
n→∞
E
[
β(n)
]
= 1. (12)
The interchange of limits in t and n needs a proper mathematical proof. This has
been done in [1] and our statement follows from their Theorem 1. For ∆-regular
graphs, bootstrap percolation is equivalent to our model. It is noticed in [1] that
the critical value on the ∆-regular random graph turns out to be the same as
that on the ∆-tree, although the proof goes along a quite different route.
4.3 Extensions: random networks and linear threshold model
In this section, we show how our approach extends to random networks and
to the linear the linear threshold model (see [6] for a rigorous proof). Let us
assume that the graph G(n) is defined via its degree sequence (Di)i∈V which
is i.i.d. distributed according to D. Such graphs can be generated using the
configuration model [10]. Let Ln =
∑n
k=1Dk, where Ln/
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edges in the graph. The underlying tree rooted at node i can be described by a
branching process with the offspring distribution of the root given by Di. Besides
the subsequent generations have offspring distribution
p
(n)
j =
n∑
k=1
1 (Dk = j + 1)
Dk
Ln
.
If the degree sequence is such that E[D2] is finite then, by the strong law of large
numbers
lim
n→∞
p
(n)
j =
(j + 1)P(D1 = j + 1)
ED
, a.s.
Let P˜ (j) = jP (j)P
j jP (j)
be the (asymptotic) probability that an edge points to
a node with degree j. Then for any fixed d, the neighbourhood of radius d about
node 0, N(0, d, G(n)) converges in distribution as n tends to infinity to a depth-d
a Galton-Watson tree with a root which has offspring distribution P and all
other nodes have offspring distribution P ∗ given by P ∗(j − 1) = P˜ (j) for all
j ≥ 1. Thus the associated fixed point equation is:
h∗ = 1− (1− α)
∑
j
P ∗(j)gj,θ(j+1)(h
∗), (13)
and we have limt→∞ β(t) = h˜ given by
h˜ = 1− (1− α)
∑
j
P (j)gj,θ(j)(h
∗). (14)
As a matter of example, for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, the fixed point equation asso-
ciated with our model is given by (13) and (14) with P (j) = P ∗(j) = e−λ λ
j
j! .
We consider the general threshold model [5]. We have a non-negative ran-
dom weight Wij on each edge, indicating the influence that i exerts on j. We
consider the symmetric case where Wij =Wji and we assume Wij are i.i.d with
distribution function W . Each node i has an arbitrary function fi defined on
subsets of its neighbours set Ni: for any set of neighbours X ⊆ Ni, there is a
value fi(X) between 0 and 1 which is monotone in the sense that if X ⊆ Y ,
then fi(X) ≤ fi(Y ). This node chooses a threshold θi at random from [0, 1] and
at time step t + 1 it becomes active, it plays B, if its set of currently active
neighbours NBi (t) satisfies fi(N
B
i (t)) > θi.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we presented two models of marketing wherein individuals, repre-
sented by a graph structure, receive payoffs to entice them to adopt a strategy
that is different from their initial choice. To this end we initially force a small
proportion of nodes to opt for the new strategy and then use an economic model
that accounts for the cascading dynamic of adoption. We analyze the evolution
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of the proportion of agents that switch to the new strategy over time. First,
the implications of our results concern marketing strategies in online social net-
works. More precisely, let α =
P
i χi
n
be the proportion of forced agents and let
M1(α) the price incurred to force the initial agents. Typically if there is a fixed
cost per agent, say c, we could take M1(α) = cα. Let β(t) be the proportion
of agents choosing B at time t: β(t) =
P
iXi(t)
n
. We have γ(t) = β(t) − α ≥ 0
which corresponds to the proportion of agents choosing B without being initially
forced. We denote byM2(γ(t)) the price incurred by the rebates until time t. We
typically take M2(γ) = rγ. Let δ(t) be the proportion of edges B −B at time t.
We denote by M3(δ(t)) the price incurred by the marketing of edges until time
t. We typically takeM3(δ) = uδ. Hence the total price of the marketing strategy
at time t is given by M(t) = M1(α) +M2(γ(t)) +M3(δ(t)). One can compute
the quantities γ(t) and δ(t) in function of α, r and u. This opens the possibilities
of doing an optimal control of the marketing policy.
Finally we remark that the marketing problem that we considered in this
paper is just one application of our method. Our approach can indeed be adapted
to the analysis of the dissemination of new versions of existing protocols, voting
protocols through simple majority rules, i.e., θ(d) = d2 and distributed digital
preservation systems [8].
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